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Incomplete Sentences: Hobby Lobby’s Corporate 
Religious Rights, the Criminally Culpable Corporate 
Soul, and the Case for Greater Alignment of 
Organizational and Individual Sentencing 
Kenya J.H. Smith 
INTRODUCTION 
“Corporations are people, my friend.”1 This now-famous statement by 
presidential candidate Mitt Romney has come to symbolize the 
predominant American perspective on the personhood of juridical entities 
and the similarities between their recognized personhood and that of 
natural persons under the law. Many American companies enjoy names 
and brands as famous as any American citizen. McDonald’s and Coca-
Cola are as well-known as LeBron James and Taylor Swift.2 Individuals 
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 1. Ashley Parker, ‘Corporations Are People,’ Romney Tells Iowa Hecklers 
Angry Over His Tax Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2011/08/12/us/politics/12romney.html [https://perma.cc/AZB5-A3HE] (“Mitt 
Romney was confronted on Thursday by hecklers on corporate tax policy and told 
one of them, ‘Corporations are people, my friend.”’). 
 2. Kurt Badenhausen, Technology Brands Rule The Top 25, FORBES (May 13, 
2015), http://www.forbes.com/powerful-brands/ [https://perma.cc/HJ5S-7FZ4] 
(ranking Coca-Cola and McDonald’s, along with six other American companies, 
among the ten most powerful brands in the world). See also Daniel Roberts & Leigh 
Gallagher, 40 Under 40, FORTUNE (Sept. 24, 2015), http://fortune.com/40-under-
40/taylor-swift-6/ [https://perma.cc/LJN4-BJAD] (ranking Taylor Swift the sixth 
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and organizations have also shared undesired notoriety and public scorn 
because of their own wrongdoing and that wrongdoing committed on their 
behalf. Mere mention of Enron, Arthur Andersen, WorldCom, and BP by 
name can evoke strong emotional responses similar to those caused by 
uttering Bernard Maddoff or Charles Ponzi himself.3 Key disparities exist, 
however, in the sentencing approaches for organizations and individuals 
under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“Reform Act”) and attendant 
sentencing guidelines.4 Most profound are the disparities exhibited by the 
goals articulated for sentencing organizations and individuals, as well as 
the availability of incarceration as a sentencing option for individuals, but 
not for organizations. Courts and scholars justify this disparate treatment 
with the historical and commonly accepted philosophy that juridical 
persons have no soul to damn.5 The Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., (“Hobby Lobby”) recognizing religious rights 
for business corporations, implicates the existence of a corporate soul and 
corresponding criminal culpability and justifies greater alignment of 
sentencing options for individuals and organizations.6  
Part I of this Article explores the history and policies that explain the 
disparate sentencing treatment of organizations and individuals under the 
Reform Act and attendant sentencing guidelines. Part II examines the 
history and evolution of personhood theories underlying these policies and 
resulting statute and guidelines. Part III examines the Hobby Lobby 
decision and how the Supreme Court’s recognition of a business 
corporation’s religious rights necessarily implicates the existence of a 
corporate soul, making those entities morally culpable and justifying 
greater alignment of the goals and sentencing options provided in the 
Reform Act and attendant guidelines. Part IV addresses the arguments 
                                                                                                             
most influential person under 40 years old); Tyler Conway, LeBron James Passes 
Michael Jordan as America's Favorite Athlete in Harris Poll, BLEACHER REPORT 
(Jul. 17, 2014), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/2133370-lebron-james-passes-
michael-jordan-as-americas-favorite-athlete-in-harris-poll [https://perma.cc/DYK8 
-QH4X] (ranking LeBron James ahead of Michael Jordan, Derek Jeter, and Peyton 
Manning in a Harris Poll measure of America’s favorite athlete, measured after 
LeBron’s return to play for the Cleveland Cavaliers). 
 3. Mary Darby, In Ponzi We Trust, SMITHSONIAN, http://www.smithsonian 
mag.com/people-places/in-ponzi-we-trust-64016168/?all [https://perma.cc/Z8UT-
6VAX] (last updated Dec. 19, 2009). 
 4. See infra Part I (discussing Sentencing Reform Act of 1984). 
 5. John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized 
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 445 (1981).  
 6. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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against amending the Reform Act and attendant guidelines for greater 
alignment of individual and organizational sentencing. The Article 
concludes that the Reform Act and attendant sentencing guidelines should 
be amended to better reflect the organizational soul and corresponding 
criminal culpability implicated by the Hobby Lobby Court’s recognition 
of business corporations’ religious rights. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF THE 
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES  
The Reform Act, part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984,7 established the United States Sentencing Commission (the 
“Commission”) as an independent agency of the judicial branch of the 
federal government. The Commission, under Congressional oversight, is 
charged with regulating and standardizing federal sentencing policies and 
procedures for convicted individuals and organizations.8 The Commission 
promulgated the original set of Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987 to 
further two articulated goals of the Reform Act—preventing and deterring 
criminal conduct.9 However, at the time, the Commission did not 
promulgate final guidelines for the sentencing of organizations “[d]ue to 
the complexity of the subject matter and the tight deadlines imposed by 
the Sentencing Reform Act.”10 While finalizing the individual sentencing 
guidelines, the Commission began yielding to the perspective “that 
corporate offenders were neither exempt nor should be exempted from 
                                                                                                             
 7. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3551; 
28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998). 
 8. John R. Steer, Changing Organizational Behavior—The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Experiment Begins to Bear Fruit (Apr. 26, 2001) (unpublished paper 
presented at the Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference on Value Inquiry, Tulsa, 
Oklahoma) (on file with author), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/train 
ing/organizational-guidelines/selected-articles/CorpBehavior2.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/AHW8-XLSX]. 
 9. Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: 
A Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. REV. 697, 699–702 
(2002); 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(2)(B) (1994) (stating that sentences should “afford 
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 992(b)(1994) 
(requiring the Commission to promulgate guidelines “to assure the meeting of the 
purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18”). 
 10. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS 1 (1991) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT]. 
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Congress’ scheme for sentencing reform”11 and decided “that drafting 
workable and reasonable corporate sentencing rules would serve [its] 
broader mandate of establishing sound and effective sentencing policies 
for the federal courts.”12 
A. Developing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
The Commission began conducting research on the sentencing 
practices for organizations in 1986.13 The Commission employed a range 
of methods to determine the best way to draft these guidelines, including 
consulting with experienced “white-collar” attorney-practitioners.14 A very 
flexible set of non-binding “policy statements” were recommended, calling 
for a substantial fine reduction when the organization had implemented an 
effective compliance program.15 The U.S. Department of Justice also 
provided a set of draft guidelines, focusing more on the aggravating factors 
that could increase an organization’s base fine.16  
The Commission finalized the organizational sentencing guidelines in 
1991, using the offense levels from the guidelines for individuals to determine 
the initial fine, or the primary sanction, as well as to determine restitution, 
remedial orders, and probation.17 The organizational guidelines also included 
mitigation credits for defendants who implemented self-policing programs 
and cooperated with investigative officials.18 The emphasis on the mitigation 
credits stems from the Commission’s belief that organizations should be self-
policing and should be rewarded when they exercise the proper due 
diligence.19 The guidelines describe due diligence as including effective 
                                                                                                             
 11. Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and 
Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U.L.Q. 205, 259 (1993).  
 12. Id. at 216.  
 13. See Murphy, supra note 9. See also SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 10, 
at 1 (“Throughout the period from 1986 to 1991 . . . the Commission conducted 
empirical research and analysis on organizational sentencing practices.”).  
 14. See Steer, supra note 8, at 5. 
 15. Id. at 5. 
 16. Id. The schedule of organizational fines was largely based on guidelines 
set for individuals. Id. 
 17. Id. at 6; see also Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate 
Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45, 48–50 (2006). 
 18. See Orland, supra note 17, at 48.  
 19. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2011). Section 8B2.1(a) of the Guidelines Manual states: 
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compliance programs; due care not to delegate important responsibilities 
to known high-risk persons; audited and monitored program operations; 
and consistent discipline of employee violators.20 Although the sentencing 
guidelines for organizations incorporate the assumption that organizations 
should generally be treated as persons in ways similar to individuals, the 
organizational guidelines omit a major sentencing option for individuals—
incarceration.21 
B. Policies Driving Individual and Organizational Sentencing  
Under the Reform Act, there are three forms of sanctions available for 
individual offenders: fines, probation, and imprisonment.22 These tools 
provide courts with viable options in crafting sentences best suited to the 
circumstances and the individual offender. However, the Reform Act 
section addressing organizations includes only two of these sanctions: 
probation and fines.23 Included in both categories, and allowed for both 
individuals and organizations, is the sanction of forfeiture.24 The policies 
driving the two sets of guidelines have apparent commonality, but 
disparities become most evident in implementation.  
American criminal and civil laws draw distinctions between individuals 
and organizations. The federal sentencing guidelines for individuals focus 
on punishment and incapacitation.25 The policy goal of punishing individual 
wrongdoing can be achieved through fines and probation as less intrusive 
sanctions, while imprisonment can be imposed to punish greater 
                                                                                                             
To have an effective compliance and ethics program, for purposes of 
subsection (f) of §8C2.5 (Culpability Score) and subsection (b)(1) of 
§8D1.4 (Recommended Conditions of Probation - Organizations), an 
organization shall— (1) exercise due diligence to prevent and detect 
criminal conduct; and (2) otherwise promote an organizational culture 
that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with 
the law. 
Id. § 8B2.1(a). 
 20. See Steer, supra note 8, at 7–8.  
 21. Steven Walt & William S. Laufer, Why Personhood Doesn’t Matter: 
Corporate Criminal Liability and Sanctions, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263, 279 (1991).  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. See also 37 C.J.S. Forfeitures §48 (2008) (defining forfeiture as the 
proceeding though which a person is forced to surrender money or other property 
as punishment for wrongdoing). 
 25. See Murphy, supra note 9, at 702. 
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culpability.26 Punishment is derived, at least in part, from the perceived 
need of retribution and the concept of punishing individuals in proportion 
to their culpability.27 Therefore, punishment is justified if the offender is 
morally culpable.28 Incapacitation is designed to prevent the offender from 
committing future offenses.29 The goal of incapacitation may be satisfied by 
sentences ranging from probation to imprisonment, and even death.30 To 
achieve these goals, the individual guidelines provide a method for 
determining the appropriate term of probation or imprisonment in 
proportion to the offense.31  
In contrast, the organizational sentencing guidelines focus on restitution 
and deterrence and generally allow only sentences of probation or fines.32 
Although the individual sentencing guidelines focus first on determining the 
term of imprisonment, the organizational sentencing guidelines focus first on 
providing restitution, with the amount of restitution calculated in proportion 
to the organization’s culpability and the harm to the victim.33 It is important 
to note that the amount imposed on the organization to remedy the harm 
caused by criminal conduct is not deemed a punishment, but a means of 
making victims whole again.34 In advancing the deterrence objective, large 
organizational fines with the possibility of restrictive probation are presumed 
to effectively deter organizations from further criminal conduct.35 Restrictive 
probation, if needed, may include the appointment of a “special master” or the 
creation of auditing and monitoring groups within the organization.36 The 
                                                                                                             
 26. See Walt & Laufer, supra note 21, at 279. 
 27. See Murphy, supra note 9, at 702–03. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Kevin Bennardo, Incarceration’s Incapacitative Shortcomings, 54 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 2 (2014).  
 30. Id. at 3–5; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2012) (providing a death penalty 
for certain delineated crimes including espionage, treason, intentionally killing 
the victim, and violating the Controlled Substances Act with aggravating factors).  
 31. See Murphy, supra note 9, at 703. 
 32. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8, introductory cmt. (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).  
 33. Timothy A. Johnson, Sentencing Organizations After Booker, 116 YALE 
L.J. 632, 643–45 (2006). After a finding of guilt, the judge will calculate a “base 
fine” by looking at the offense level of the crime, and then use the “Offense Level 
Fine Table” to adjust the fine to the appropriate offense level. U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2A, 8C2.4(d) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). See 
also id. § 8C2.3-7.  
 34. See Murphy, supra note 9, at 705.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 708.  
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organizational sentencing guidelines set forth the circumstances in which an 
organization should be placed on probation to ensure payment of restitution 
and to keep the organization on track to a crime-free operation.37  
Although not expressly stated as a goal of the sentencing guidelines, 
rehabilitation of the organizational defendant can be inferred from the 
sentencing conditions.38 By comparison, rehabilitative sentencing for 
individuals addicted to drugs can prove effective in reforming the offender 
and preventing future crime along with attendant recidivism.39 The 
importance of restitution as a means of rehabilitating an offender is 
highlighted in Kelly v. Robinson: 
Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the 
defendant to confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions have 
caused. Such a penalty will affect the defendant differently than a 
traditional fine, paid to the State as an abstract and impersonal entity, 
and often calculated without regard to the harm the defendant has 
caused. Similarly, the direct relation between the harm and the 
punishment gives restitution a more precise deterrent effect than a 
traditional fine.40 
Determining whether the individual is actually rehabilitated is difficult 
because the standard is inherently subjective.41 The rehabilitation of an 
organization can be more easily measured because the organization’s reform 
efforts are more transparent and verifiable.42 As a condition of probation, the 
court can require that the organization develop and submit an effective 
compliance and ethics program.43 Although crafted for deterrence, these 
programs also assist in rehabilitating the organization by requiring that it 
develop new, more beneficial, and crime-free business practices.44  
                                                                                                             
 37. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015).  
 38. See Murphy, supra note 9, at 703 (stating that restitution is an example of 
organizational reformation through remediation of the harm).  
 39. Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for 
Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1427–29 (2009).  
 40. Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1986).  
 41. See Henning, supra note 39, at 1428. 
 42. Id.  
 43. U.S. SENTENCING, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.4(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015). The programs that satisfy the requirement are outlined in Section 
8B2.1 of the Guidelines Manual.  
 44. See Henning, supra note 39, at 1428.  
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The need for separate organizational and individual guidelines originally 
stemmed from distinct differences between the two.45 Entities are deemed 
incapable of committing certain crimes because the elements of the crime 
require commission by an individual.46 When the organization is inherently 
precluded from committing the offense, the organization cannot be charged, 
convicted, or sentenced regarding the same.47 Courts have attempted to 
address this problem by importing the tort doctrine of vicarious liability.48  
A connected rationale stemming from the generally recognized 
incorporeal nature of the organization is that incarceration, one of the harshest 
penalties available for individuals, is deemed not to be a viable option for 
sentencing organizations.49 Incarcerating an entire organization is considered 
unrealistic and unworkable, especially if the incarceration would involve 
jailing innocent individuals.50 Accordingly, courts use fines to make the 
greatest impact on organizations.51  
C. Law in Action: Judicial and Prosecutorial Discretion in Sentencing 
Despite the Reform Act and attendant guidelines being designed 
specifically to standardize federal sentencing and balance priorities for 
organizations and individuals, these efforts suffered arguably their biggest 
setback in United States v. Booker.52 The Booker Court invalidated the 
Reform Act’s § 3553 mandate that judges follow the sentencing guidelines.53 
Under § 3553, the sentencing guidelines required that a judge, in determining 
the sentence, make factual findings beyond those found at trial by the jury 
when determining guilt.54 The Court held that this combination of judicial 
fact-finding with the mandatory nature of the sentencing guidelines 
                                                                                                             
 45. See discussion of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014), infra Part III. 
 46. See Walt & Laufer, supra note 21, at 278.  
 47. Id. at 265.  
 48. See discussion infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 49. See Henning, supra note 39, at 1424.  
 50. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 51. Fines have been criticized as inadequate in deterring illegal activity, as 
large organizations with significant financial resources can build potential fines 
into their cost structures, negating any deterrent effect. See Johnson, supra note 
33, at 645–48.  
 52. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
 53. Id. at 222–25; see Johnson, supra note 33, at 636.  
 54. Johnson, supra note 33, at 636. 
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violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.55 Although Booker 
addressed only the effect of § 3553 regarding the rights of individuals, the 
section’s applicability to organizations likely extends the Booker prohibition 
to the sentencing of those juridical entities also.56 
Similar to judicial sentencing discretion, prosecutorial discretion also 
plays an important role in the ultimate sentencing of organizations and 
individuals. As entity-related wrongdoing typically implicates multiple 
culpable parties, prosecutors must choose whether to prosecute the 
organization, the individual actors, or some combination of both.57 Following 
the promulgation of the organizational guidelines and the Enron scandal, 
Deputy Attorneys General Eric Holder and Larry Thompson issued 
memoranda detailing factors to consider in deciding whether to charge an 
organization and emphasizing consideration of the existence of a compliance 
program.58 Although the existence of a compliance program does not inhibit 
criminal prosecution, prosecutors were advised to consider the compliance 
program’s design and effectiveness as mitigating factors.59 Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements (“DPAs”) and Non-Prosecution Agreements 
(“NPAs”) serve as key prosecutorial tools, facilitating judicial efficiency and 
allowing the Justice Department to resolve criminal investigations of 
organizations often without the necessity of a formal indictment.60 DPAs are 
explicitly authorized by federal statute.61 This prosecutorial mechanism 
allows the corporation to avoid the stigma of a formal conviction and its 
                                                                                                             
 55. Id. at 635; see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 244–45, 249.  
 56. See Johnson, supra note 33, at 634. 
 57. See Orland, supra note 17, at 51. 
 58. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, to All 
Component Heads and United States Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against 
Corporations (June 16, 1999) (on file with author), rev’d by Memorandum by 
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, to All Heads of Department 
Components, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (January 
20, 2003) (on file with author), superseded by Memorandum by Paul J. McNulty, 
to Heads of Department Components, United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations (December 12, 2006) (on file with author).  
 59. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 cmt. 4 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015)). Larger, more impactful organization will tend to 
have more efficiently designed and complex compliance programs as compared 
to smaller organizations. Henning, supra note 39, at 1429–31. 
 60. See Orland, supra note 17, at 55–56. See also Henning, supra note 39, at 
1432 (acknowledging that the line between DPAs and NPAs is unclear). 
 61. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076, 2086-88 
(1975) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152–3154 (2000)).  
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collateral consequences.62 Defendants are usually granted an opportunity 
to have the charges dismissed after an agreed upon period of time, 
typically one to two years, during which the defendant must comply with 
the terms of the agreement.63  
DPAs can be readily compared to state-level, pre-trial diversion 
programs, in which prosecutors consider mitigating factors and can defer 
charges, contingent upon the defendants’ completion of classes, completion 
of community services, or payment of restitution. Diversion programs 
originally were reserved for “first offender street criminals.”64 However, the 
Justice Department has experienced benefits from these agreements.65 
II. PERSONHOOD DISTINCTIONS HISTORICALLY JUSTIFIED DISPARATE 
SENTENCING TREATMENT OF ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS 
Enron, WorldCom, and BP became infamous examples of the disparate 
sentencing treatment afforded under the sentencing guidelines to individuals 
and organizations involved in the same wrongdoing. In each matter, the 
involved entity was considered a separate person under the law and deemed 
responsible for wrongdoing and resulting damages, yet faced sentences vastly 
different from those faced by individual defendants.  
                                                                                                             
 62. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal 
Liability: Containing the Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 
ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 944 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT OF THE AD 
HOC ADVISORY GROUP ON THE  ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 21 
(2003), http://www.ussc.gov/training/organizational-guidelines/report-ad-hoc-
advisory-group-organizational-sentencing-guidelines-october-7-2003 [https://per 
ma.cc/YSE3-FKBV] [hereinafter, U.S.S.C. REPORT]); see also Nagel & Winthrop, 
supra note 11, at 245. 
 63. Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Humanization of the Corporate Entity: 
Changing Views of Corporate Criminal Liability in the Wake of Citizens United, 
65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 18–22 (2010) (providing an overview of deferred 
prosecution agreements, non-prosecution agreements, and the policies underlying 
their application). 
 64. See Orland, supra note 17, at 57. 
 65. See id. at 62 (“By and large, [deferred prosecution agreements have] 
worked well . . . . We’ve been able to recover a lot of money for victims without 
going through the delay and expense of a trial, and we’ve seen some positive . . . 
internal reforms.”). 
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A. Enron, WorldCom, and BP: Case Studies in Sentencing Disparities 
The Enron scandal and resulting collapse provides a good recent 
example of a company and its executives becoming symbols of public 
disdain over corporate abuses.66 Enron Corporation was an American 
energy company that failed when an elaborate and unsupported corporate 
debt rubric justified through high-risk accounting practices was 
uncovered, leading to the company’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy.67 Enron was 
never prosecuted as an entity, perhaps because of its worthlessness as a 
going concern.68 Perhaps bankruptcy proceedings were deemed sufficient 
to remedy the wrongs committed and attempt to compensate injured 
parties.69 However, several high-ranking Enron officers were prosecuted 
and sentenced to federal prison. Jeffrey Skilling, former Enron CEO, was 
convicted of fraud and sentenced to 24 years in prison, though that 
sentence was later reduced to 14 years as a part of a plea bargain involving 
restitution to the victims of his fraudulent activities.70 Andrew Fastow, 
Enron CFO, was sentenced to six years in federal prison and two years of 
probation after agreeing to plead guilty to wire fraud and securities fraud 
and to testify against Skilling and Kenneth Lay, Enron founder and 
                                                                                                             
 66. Matthew DiLallo, Enron Scandal: A Devastating Reminder of the Dangers 
of Debt, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Jun. 21, 2015, 7:00 PM), http://www.fool 
.com/investing/general/2015/06/21/enron-scandal-a-devastating-reminder-of-the- 
danger.aspx [https://perma.cc/LZ2P-TTRF].  
 67. Id.  
 68. See generally Alexei Barrionuevo, Enron Chiefs Guilty of Fraud and 
Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/25/bus 
iness/25cnd-enron.html (detailing trials of several Enron executives, but mentioning 
Arthur Andersen’s trial as an entity); The Going Concern Principle, ACCOUNTING 
TOOLS, http://www.accountingtools.com/going-concern-principle [https://perma.cc/ 
HWG9-JKKY] (last visited Sept. 22, 2016) (defining going-concern principle as “the 
assumption that an entity will remain in business for the foreseeable future.”).  
 69. Caitlin F. Saladrigas, Corporate Criminal Liability: Lessons from the 
Rothstein Debacle, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 435 (2012) (containing a detailed 
discussion of the complications in coordinating simultaneous prosecutions and 
bankruptcy proceedings involving the same corporate and individual 
wrongdoers). 
 70. Peter Lattman, Ex-Enron Chief’s Sentence is Cut by 10 Years, to 14, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jun. 21, 2013, 4:52 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/prison-
sentence-of-ex-enron-ceo-skilling-cut-by-10-years-2/ [https://perma.cc/R9QX-TCYJ]. 
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chairman.71 Lay was convicted on ten counts of securities fraud but died 
before sentencing.72  
Arthur Andersen LLP (“Andersen”) served as auditors for Enron 
during the accounting fraud scandal.73 In an unprecedented entity 
prosecution, Andersen was convicted of obstruction of justice charges largely 
stemming from the destruction of files associated with Andersen’s audit of 
Enron, deemed to have been based on the advice in Nancy Temple’s memo.74 
Andersen’s sentence of six years of probation and a $500,000 fine was the 
maximum provided in the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and on par 
with penalties negotiated under other DPAs reached during that period.75 The 
conviction was later overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court because the jury 
instructions did not require a specific finding of criminal intent by 
Andersen to support its conviction.76 However, the victory provided little 
                                                                                                             
 71. Douglas O. Linder, The Enron Trial: Andy Fastow’s Plea Agreement, U. 
OF MO.-KAN. CITY SCH. OF L., http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/enron 
/fastowplea.html [https://perma.cc/HW8V-JL89] (last visited Aug. 3, 2016). 
 72. United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869 (S.D. Tex. 2006).  
 73. Joel Roberts, Andersen Gets Probation in Enron Case, CBS NEWS (Oct. 
16, 2002, 3:25 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/andersen-gets-probation-in-
enron-case/ [https://perma.cc/S37C-557M]. 
 74. Steven R. Strahler, Nancy Temple Reclaims Her Reputation and Rebuilds 
a Career Derailed by Andersen Trial, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS (Apr. 10, 2010), 
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20100410/ISSUE01/100033245/nancy- 
 temple-reclaims-her-reputation-and-rebuilds-a-career-derailed-by-andersen-trial 
[https://perma.cc/6R37-5JVR] (Temple, Andersen’s in-house counsel, has been 
commonly referred to as the “corrupt persuader” for the document retention memo 
that was interpreted as advice to destroy Anderson files related to its representation 
of Enron. Temple invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and 
was never charged with a crime.); see also Luisa Beltran, Brett Gering & Alice 
Martin, Andersen Guilty, CNN MONEY (Jun. 16, 2002, 4:43 PM), http://money 
.cnn.com/2002/06/13/news/andersen_verdict/ [https://perma.cc/QT7K-7Q7B]. 
 75. See Orland, supra note 17, at 72 tbl.I (showing a range of fines and 
probationary periods included in Deferred Prosecution Agreements between 1993 
and 2004). 
 76. Arthur Andersen LLP v. U.S., 544 U.S. 696, 697 (2005) (“The jury 
instructions failed to convey the requisite consciousness of wrongdoing. Indeed, 
it is striking how little culpability the instructions required. For example, the jury 
was told that, even if petitioner honestly and sincerely believed its conduct was 
lawful, the jury could convict. The instructions also diluted the meaning of 
‘corruptly’ such that it covered innocent conduct.”). 
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comfort to Andersen partners, employees, and prosecution critics, as the 
conviction effectively drove the accounting firm out of business.77 
In the Andersen aftermath, federal prosecutors responded to a firestorm 
of criticism for what was deemed extreme prosecutorial overreach with a 
shift in favor of DPAs and NPAs.78 The WorldCom prosecutions exhibited 
this stark contrast in sentencing approaches. As with Enron, the discovery 
of fraudulent accounting practices led by top WorldCom executives 
triggered the company’s demise and subsequent Chapter 11 bankruptcy.79 
Unlike Enron or Andersen, WorldCom entered into a DPA with federal 
prosecutors under which the company received two years of probation and 
no fines.80 CEO Bernard Ebbers was convicted of securities fraud and other 
charges and sentenced to 25 years in prison.81 CFO Scott Sullivan pled 
                                                                                                             
 77. Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of 
Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1364–66 (2009) (citing Ken Brown & 
Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Arthur Andersen's Fall from Grace is a Sad Tale of Greed 
and Miscues, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 7, 2002), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB102 
3409436545200 [https://perma.cc/GG2V-69Y4] (reporting that Arthur Andersen 
employed 85,000 people worldwide). 
 78. See Orland, supra note 17, at 45 (noting that “[b]etween 1992 and 2006, 
the Justice Department resolved forty-four criminal cases by either a deferred 
prosecution or non-prosecution agreement”). 
 79. Reuters, The Rise and Fall of WorldCom, Chronology of Key Events, USA 
TODAY, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/telecom/2002-07-21-
worldcom-chronology_x.htm# [https://perma.cc/DP7C-G8M3] (last visited Feb. 6, 
2016); DENNIS R. BERESFORD, NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH & C.B. ROGERS, JR., 
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF THE BD. OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM, INC., 
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 47 (2003), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data 
/723527/000093176303001862/dex991.htm [https://perma.cc/ARU2-KT8Y] (MCI 
merged with WorldCom and secured FCC approval of the deal in 1998); Press 
Release, Federal Commc’n Comm’n, FCC Approves Merger of WorldCom and MCI 
(Sept. 14, 1998), https://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/News_Releases 
/1998/nrcc8061.html [https://perma.cc/5WQY-5RE9]. Following its emergence from 
bankruptcy, the company formally changed its name to MCI. MCI Inc., (Form 425) 
(Mar. 17, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723527/0000950103-05-
000464.txt [https://perma.cc/AC84-WMRN]. The company was later acquired by 
Verizon Communications. Press Release, Federal Commc’n Comm’n, FCC Approves 
SBC/AT&T and Verizon/MCI Mergers (Oct. 31, 2005), https://apps.fcc.gov/e 
docs_public/attachmatch/DOC-261936A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/TEU4-M4S8]. 
 80. See Orland, supra note 17, at 72, tbl.II. 
 81. Dan Ackman, Bernie Ebbers Guilty, FORBES (Mar. 15, 2005, 2:30 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2005/03/15/cx_da_0315ebbersguilty.html [https://perma.cc 
/AVH5-VQG3]; Top 10 Crooked CEOs, TIME, http://content.time.com/time/specials 
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guilty to accounting fraud, agreed to pay restitution for investor losses, and 
received a reduced sentence of five years in exchange for helping federal 
prosecutors in convicting his former boss, Ebbers.82 The scandal produced 
plea deals by other WorldCom executives while leaving former employees 
and creditors holding worthless claims against the company. The Enron and 
WorldCom scandals became catalysts for passage of federal legislation 
designed to prevent replication of their disastrous accounting and 
management practices.83 
The 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill provides a more contemporary 
contrast in approaches to sentencing organizations and the individual agents 
involved in the same criminal wrongdoing. This unfortunate disaster claimed 
the lives of 11 people and impacted many more.84 In 2014, BP reached a plea 
agreement with federal prosecutors, agreeing to plead guilty to 11 counts of 
felony manslaughter and one count of obstruction of justice, pay $4 billion in 
fines, and serve a five-year probation term.85 This arrangement was not BP’s 
                                                                                                             
/packages/article/0,28804,1903155_1903156_1903277,00.html [https://perma.cc/6N 
CW-XV4C] (last visited Aug. 3, 2016).  
 82. Jennifer Bayot & Roben Farzad, Ex-WorldCom Officer Sentenced to 5 Years 
in Accounting Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2005), http://www.ny times.com/2005 
/08/12/business/exworldcom-officer-sentenced-to-5-years-in-accounting-fraud.html? 
_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9UCR-ND46] (“‘Mr. Sullivan, you would have faced a 
substantial sentence had you not cooperated with the government,’ Judge Barbara S. 
Jones gently told him in United States District Court in Manhattan.”); Ebbers Indicted, 
Ex-CFO Pleads Guilty, CNN MONEY (Mar. 2, 2004, 4:07 PM), http://money.cnn 
.com/2004/03/02/technology/ebbers/ [https://perma.cc/S92V-D6U3]. 
 83. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) 
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, & 29 U.S.C.) (increasing penalties 
for the destruction of evidence needed in a federal investigation). 
 84. BP Settles Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Claims, CBS NEWS (Oct. 5, 2015, 
4:02 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bp-settles-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-
in-gulf-of-mexico-for-20-billion/ (“The spill followed the April 2010 explosion 
on an offshore rig that killed 11 workers.”). See Steven Mufson, BP Settles 
Criminal Charges for $4 Billion in Spill: Supervisors Indicted on Manslaughter, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/econo 
my/bp-to-pay-billions-in-gulf-oil-spill-settlement/2012/11/15/ba0b783a-2f2e-11 
e2-9f50-0308e1e75445_story.html (stating BP plead guilty to fourteen criminal 
counts, which included manslaughter resulting from the disaster).  
 85. Mark Schleifstein, Federal Judge Accepts $4 Billion BP Guilty Plea for 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Disaster, TIMES PICAYUNE (Jan. 30, 2013, 2:39 AM), 
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2013/01/federal_judge_ accepts_4 
_billio.html [https://perma.cc/NQ59-6B7Y]. BP America Vice President expressly 
admitted culpability on behalf of the company:  
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first plea agreement, leading critics to cite the company as an example of 
problems in the system.86 Meanwhile, Donald Valdrine and Robert 
Kaluza, two rig supervisors who became the faces of the safety and 
monitoring failures that led to the rig explosion, were charged with 
involuntary manslaughter, seaman’s manslaughter, and violations of the 
Clean Water Act.87 Each seaman’s manslaughter count carried a potential 
ten-year prison term and each involuntary manslaughter count carried 
eight years.88 By 2015, all charges had been dismissed, bringing the 
prosecution of both men to a close.89 Neither BP nor any of its agents 
                                                                                                             
“We—and by that I mean the men and the women of the management of 
BP, its Board of Directors, and its many employees—are deeply sorry 
for the tragic loss of the 11 men who died and the others who were 
injured that day,” he said. “Our guilty plea makes clear, BP understands 
and acknowledges its role in that tragedy, and we apologize—BP 
apologizes—to all those injured and especially to the families of the lost 
loved ones. BP is also sorry for the harm to the environment that resulted 
from the spill, and we apologize to the individuals and communities who 
were injured.” 
Id. 
 86. Justin M. Davidson, Comment, Polluting Without Consequence: How BP 
and Other Large Government Contractors Evade Suspension and Debarment for 
Environmental Crime and Misconduct, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 257, 274–75 (2011) 
(citing Jason Leopold, Ex-EPA Officials: Why Isn't BP Under Criminal 
Investigation?, TRUTH-OUT (May 27, 2010), http://www.truth-out.org/ex-epa-
officials-why-isnt-bp-under-criminal-investigation59936 [https://perma.cc/LD4E-
YKRN] (criticizing a 2004 DPA between BP and the SEC involving an alleged price-
fixing gas market scheme involving propane trading)). 
 87. Superseding Indictment for Involuntary Manslaughter and Seaman’s 
Manslaughter and Clean Water Act, U.S. v. Robert Kaluza and Donald Valdrine, No. 
12-265 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/25 
20121115143638743323.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q654-BALC].  
 88. Steven Mufson, BP Settles Criminal Charges for $4 Billion in Spill; 
Supervisors Indicted on Manslaughter, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/bp-to-pay-billions-in-gulf-oil-spill-settle 
ment/2012/11/15/ba0b783a-2f2e-11e2-9f50-0308e1e75445_story.html [https://per 
ma.cc/CAQ5-3H88].  
 89. U.S. v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Oliver Milman, 
Manslaughter Charges Dropped Against Two BP Employees in Deepwater Spill, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2015, 1:08 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment 
/2015/dec/03/manslaughter-charges-dropped-bp-employees-deepwater-horizon-oil-
spill [https://perma.cc/SKP4-FME3].  
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ultimately received a penalty not set out in the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines.90 
In each of the forgoing examples, the individuals involved faced 
incarceration, a penalty not faced by the companies involved. This disparity 
in consequences is directly tied to the Reform Act, the attendant guidelines, 
and the policy goals articulated in each for sentencing individuals and 
organizations. The disparity in policy goals and resulting treatment is rooted 
in historical personhood distinctions ascribed to organizations and 
individuals. The Hobby Lobby Court’s recognition of a business corporation’s 
religious rights and the implicated corporate soul mandates reconsideration of 
the disparate sentencing treatment of comparably culpable persons. 
B. A History of “Personhood” and Criminal Culpability 
Like other constitutional rights and responsibilities, criminal culpability 
is largely based on recognition of personhood.91 At English common law, 
entities were not considered culpable because they lacked the requisite body 
and soul. As Baron Thurlow famously lamented when addressing corporate 
criminal culpability, “[d]id you ever expect a corporation to have a 
conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be 
kicked?”92  
                                                                                                             
 90. Jennifer Larino, Jury Acquits BP Exec Accused of Lying About Oil Spill Flow, 
TIMES PICAYUNE (Jun. 5, 2015, 2:35 PM, updated Jun. 5, 2015, 3:33 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/06/david_rainey_acquitted_ bp_oil.html 
[https://perma.cc/5V8R-UNQ7]; Walter Pavlo, Government Drops Obstruction 
Charges Against Former BP Engineer Kurt Mix, FORBES (Nov. 6, 2015, 11:56 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2015/11/06/government-drops-obstruction-
charges-against-former-bp-engineer-kurt-mix/#293bc67653a3 [https://perma.cc/N5E 
L-PAVQ]. The Department of Justice agreed to drop the obstruction of justice 
charges, and Mix agreed to plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge of computer fraud 
and abuse, resulting in six months of probation and 60 hours of community service. 
Id.  
 91. Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional 
Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 
100 (2009). 
 92. Coffee, supra note 5, at 386 (first citing M. KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND 
THE CORPORATION 1 (1977); and then citing H.L. MENCKEN, A NEW DICTIONARY 
OF QUOTATIONS ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES FROM ANCIENT AND MODERN 
SOURCES 223 (1942) for the notation that “[o]ne version, probably apocryphal, 
reports that the Lord Chancellor added in a stage whisper, ‘[a]nd, by God, it ought 
to have both”). 
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Similarly, corporate powers were generally restricted to purposes 
specifically provided in their charters under early English common law.93 
This constrained perspective of corporate personhood was adopted by the 
framers of the U.S. Constitution and incorporated into early American 
jurisprudence.94 In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, Justice 
Marshall famously declared, “[a] corporation is an artificial being, 
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”95 This 
opinion represented the artificial entity theory, which holds that the 
entity’s very existence was a function of sovereign grace.96 Entities were 
chartered for specific purposes, usually involving a demonstrable public 
good.97 This perspective represented a less developed economic system 
with few sophisticated business entities.98  
As the needs of a growing nation changed, a more business-friendly 
political climate emerged favoring “free incorporation” in hopes of 
removing the threat of corruption incumbent in a more restricted 
incorporation process.99 The artificial entity theory began to yield to the 
aggregate theory, a new perspective on corporate personhood that recognized 
                                                                                                             
 93. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 88 (1809). The Supreme 
Court acknowledged that “our ideas of a corporation, its privileges and its 
disabilities, are derived entirely from the English books, we resort to them for aid, 
in ascertaining its character.” Id. See also Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Com’n, 558 U.S. 310, 386 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 94. 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
§ 2, at 7–8 (Carol A. Jones ed., Thomson/West 2006) (1917) (“Historically, there was 
a distrust or disfavor of private corporations. Some of the states ratified the 
Constitution with misgivings respecting the power of Congress to form corporations, 
which in fact created but few . . . leaving this matter to the states . . . .”).  
 95. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
 96. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 129–32 (3d 
ed. 2005) (discussing the history of corporations as special charters from the state). 
 97. Id. at 131 (noting that early corporations “were chartered to do work that 
was traditionally public” and “tended to vest exclusive control over a public asset, 
a natural resource, or a business opportunity in one group of favorites or investors”). 
 98. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical 
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1483 (1989) (“The economy 
closely resembled the atomistic type described in Adam Smith's classical theory. 
Economic units tended to be individual rather than collective. Individuals 
produced goods for sale in the market. Individuals bought goods for consumption 
in the market. To the extent production was organized, the market did the 
organizing by coordinating prices.”).  
 99. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate 
Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 181 (1985). 
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the corporation as a conduit for advancing the interests of natural persons 
represented by the corporation.100 The philosophical evolution of corporate 
personhood was represented in the Railroad Tax Cases101 and Santa Clara 
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad.102 In the Railroad Tax Cases, Justice 
Field, sitting on the Circuit Court for the District of California, found 
California’s property tax framework unconstitutionally discriminatory against 
corporations, which were deemed “persons” entitled to equal protection under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.103 In Santa Clara County v. Pacific Railroad, the 
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the corporate personhood findings of the 
Railroad Tax Cases in short, and Chief Justice Waite provided now famous 
prefatory remarks.104 These cases provided the cornerstone of the aggregate 
theory.105 A related philosophy, the real entity theory, also embraces the 
explanation of corporations as a natural consequence of group dynamics, 
analogous to a family, religious congregation, or other types of assemblies 
                                                                                                             
 100. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 91 (1805) (“[T]he term 
citizen ought to be understood as it is used in the constitution, and as it is used in 
other laws. That is, to describe the real persons who come into court, in this case, 
under their corporate name.”). 
 101. San Mateo Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co. (Railroad Tax Cases), 13 F. 722 
(C.C.D. Cal. 1882). 
 102. Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).  
 103. See Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. at 730 (“Whatever acts may be imputed 
justly or unjustly to the corporations, they are entitled when they enter the 
tribunals of the nation to have the same justice meted out to them which is meted 
out to the humblest citizen. There cannot be one law for them and another law for 
others.”). 
 104. See Santa Clara Cty., 118 U.S. at 396 (“Mr. Chief Justice Waite said: The 
court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these 
corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.”). Although the Chief Justice’s 
remarks could be considered dicta, the case has been cited over 900 times in court 
decisions and secondary sources.  
 105. See Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. at 743 (“[W]e think that it is well 
established by numerous adjudications of the supreme court of the United States 
and of the several states, that whenever a provision of the constitution, or of a law, 
guaranties to persons the enjoyment of property, or affords to them means for its 
protection, or prohibits legislation injuriously affecting it, the benefits of the 
provision extend to corporations, and that the courts will always look beyond the 
name of the artificial being to the individuals whom it represents.”). For an 
overview of the 19th-century history of aggregate theory, see Horwitz, supra note 
99, at 177–78.  
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formed by groups of natural persons.106 However, real entity theorists 
advocate fully recognizing the entity as naturally existing beyond 
permission granted by its members or the government.107 The potency of 
this perspective stems from the core recognition of separate entity 
personhood in ways that places it on par with natural persons under the 
Constitution.108 However, the aggregate theory emerged as a more overtly 
popular option for courts in their attempts “to reap all of the benefits of the 
real entity theory without all of the metaphorical hocus pocus.”109 
The courts of the newly industrialized America struggled to hold these 
increasingly powerful and influential corporate citizens responsible for 
their wrongdoing.110 Courts exhibited great creativity in fashioning 
methods of addressing culpable corporate behavior.111 The U.S. Supreme 
Court changed the corporate criminal liability landscape for the next century 
in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States (“N.Y. 
Central & Hudson”), importing the tort doctrine of respondeat superior as 
                                                                                                             
 106. 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
§ 1 (2d ed. 1886) (“The conception of a number of individuals as a corporate or 
collective entity occurs in the earliest stages of human development, and is essential 
to many of the most ordinary processes of thought. Thus, the existence of tribes, 
village communities, families, clans, and nations implies a conception of these several 
bodies of individuals as entities having corporate rights and attributes . . . . So, in 
numberless other instances, associations which are not legally incorporated are 
considered as personified entities, acting as a unit and in one name; for example, 
political parties, societies, committees, courts.”). 
 107. See Ripken, supra note 91, at 112–13. 
 108. A corporation is viewed as a separate entity for purposes of the Article III 
citizenship clause, without regard to the fact that it may contain shareholders of 
any number of states or countries. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 
1187–88 (2010) (showing the development of the doctrine that a corporation is a 
citizen of the state where it is incorporated and has its principal place of business 
for jurisdiction purposes). See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, 
McDonald, and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
887, 924 n. 235 (2011). 
 109. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 110. See Henning, supra note 39 (analyzing the prosecution of criminal actions 
against corporations). 
 111. Christopher Slobogin, Citizens United and Corporate and Human Crime, 
41 STETSON L. REV. 127, 129 (2011). (“[S]trict liability and liability for simple 
negligence, currently staples of corporate criminal doctrine, are usually anathema 
when a person is being punished, at least when the punishment involves 
something other than a small fine.” (citing N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. 
v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493–94 (1909))). 
94 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
 
 
 
a basis for imposing criminal liability on corporations for the actions of their 
agents.112 This doctrine maintains its prominence in today’s criminal justice 
jurisprudence, justifying real and aggregate entity theories and providing a 
primary basis for culpability in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for 
Organizations.113  
Since N.Y. Central & Hudson, entity personhood has grown increasingly 
similar to natural personhood in civil and criminal justice contexts. These 
entities enjoy Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches.114 
Corporations possess Fifth Amendment rights against double jeopardy.115 The 
Sixth Amendment guarantees corporations a right to trial by jury.116 
Corporations also have a right to the assistance of counsel.117 The U.S. 
                                                                                                             
 112. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495–
96 (1909) (“While the law should have regard to the rights of all, and to those of 
corporations no less than to those of individuals, it cannot shut its eyes to the fact 
that the great majority of business transactions in modern times are conducted 
through these bodies, and particularly that interstate commerce is almost entirely 
in their hands, and to give them immunity from all punishment because of the old 
and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime would virtually 
take away the only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter and 
correcting the abuses aimed at.”).  
 113. See Sheyn, supra note 63, at 3. 
 114. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978) (finding a law 
permitting warrantless inspections by workplace safety regulators a violation of 
the corporation’s constitutional rights); see also United States v. Morton Salt Co., 
338 U.S. 632, 650–52 (1950) (finding lesser privacy protections for corporations 
than natural persons). 
 115. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 565, 575 (1977) 
(recognizing a corporation’s rights against double jeopardy); but see Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1906) (finding that a corporation has no power to 
claim the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). 
 116. United States v. R.L. Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377, 378–80 (6th Cir. 1971) 
(holding that corporations have the same Sixth Amendment right to jury as natural 
persons). Corporations also have a Seventh Amendment right to a jury in federal 
court. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 536, 542 (1970) (holding that an 
individual can claim derivative right to civil jury under the Seventh Amendment 
if a corporation would have had a right to a jury). 
 117. United States v. Rad-O-Lite of Philadelphia, Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 743 (3d 
Cir. 1979) (“[A]n accused has no less of a need for effective assistance due to the 
fact that it is a corporation. . . . A corporation would face these same dangers 
unless the agent representing it in court is a competent lawyer. Thus, the right to 
effective assistance of counsel is not so peculiarly applicable to individuals that 
corporations should not be entitled to it.”); but see United States v. Unimex, Inc., 
991 F.2d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Being incorporeal, corporations cannot be 
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Supreme Court has recognized growing corporate First Amendment free 
speech and press rights.118 Nonprofit and business corporations further 
enjoy a right to the free exercise of religion.119 Corporations are also 
“persons” who may spend money to influence voters, though denied 
voting rights under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, or Twenty-
Fourth Amendments.120 Despite providing a wealth of precedent, the Court 
has been criticized for creating an inconsistent personhood standard for 
entities.121  
III. HOBBY LOBBY’S RECOGNITION OF BUSINESS CORPORATE RELIGIOUS 
RIGHTS MANDATES GREATER ALIGNMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND 
INDIVIDUAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
Hobby Lobby marked a watershed moment in the Court’s recognition of 
corporate personhood. The Court addressed whether the contraception 
mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “Affordable 
Care Act”) violated the constitutional rights to free exercise of religion of two 
corporations, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga Wood Specialties, 
                                                                                                             
imprisoned, so they have no constitutional right to appointed counsel.”); United 
States v. Hartsell, 127 F.3d 343, 350 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Unimex, 991 F.2d 546 
with approval).  
 118. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) 
(discussing the corporate right to political speech); see also Grosjean v. Am. Press 
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244, 249–51 (1936) (holding that a press corporation is a 
person entitled to the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 119. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 120. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) 
(striking down restrictions on corporate independent expenditures as a First 
Amendment violation); see also Texfi Indus., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 269 
S.E.2d 142, 150 (N.C. 1980) (holding that corporations do not have the right to 
vote, maintaining the historical limitation of the right as a purely personal 
guarantee to individuals). 
 121. Miller, supra note 108, at 909–31 (“No unified theory governs when or 
to what extent the Constitution protects a corporation. Instead, the Justices resort 
to a grab bag of history, metaphysical rumination, Lochnerian tailings, and 
pragmatism to resolve the specific corporate constitutional claim at hand. The 
Court’s approach has left us with a broken and disjointed jurisprudence, a string 
cite rather than a doctrine.”); see also Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a 
General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional 
Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1425, 1465 
(1992). 
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under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”).122 In 
holding that the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate violated RFRA, 
the Court articulated an unprecedented recognition of religious rights 
possessed and exercised by business corporations. This recognition implicates 
the existence of a corporate soul and the corresponding capacity for moral 
culpability. That moral culpability in turn justifies greater alignment of the 
goals and sentencing options provided in the Reform Act and attendant 
guidelines.  
A. The Hobby Lobby Decision 
Congress enacted RFRA in response to Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.123 The Smith Court 
rejected a previously articulated balancing test for measuring government 
actions under the free religious exercise clause of the First Amendment, 
finding that “neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious 
practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest.”124 
Congress responded by codifying pre-Smith precedent, expressly stating that 
“laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as 
laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.”125 The Hobby Lobby Court 
held that business corporations enjoyed the same free exercise of religion 
protection generally afforded individuals and religious nonprofit 
corporations.126 The Court justified its holding by employing the agency 
                                                                                                             
 122. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 123. 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND 
JUSTICE 123 (9th ed. 2016) (“Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the 
Court’s decision in Employment Div. Dept. of Human Resources of Ore v. Smith 
. . . .”).  
 124. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760–61 (“In determining whether 
challenged government actions violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment, those decisions used a balancing test that took into account whether 
the challenged action imposed a substantial burden on the practice of religion, and 
if it did, whether it was needed to serve a compelling government interest.”).  
 125. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) 
(1993); see also § 2000bb(a)(4) (1993). 
 126. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770–71 (“While it is certainly true that 
a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make money, modern corporate 
law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of 
everything else, and many do not do so. . . . If for-profit corporations may pursue 
such worthy objectives, there is no apparent reason why they may not further 
religious objectives as well.”). 
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principles of the aggregate theory.127 The dissent criticized the decision as 
effectively endowing religious rights on all corporations, regardless of size 
and complexity.128 The majority sidestepped this issue by deeming the 
problem unlikely and unripe.129  
The Hobby Lobby majority, while insisting that corporate free exercise of 
religious rights was recognized for the protection of individual beneficiaries, 
did not deny the separateness and fundamental personhood of each 
corporation under the law, leaning heavily on the companies’ claims that their 
religious beliefs and those held by their owners forbade compliance with the 
Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate.130 This separateness provided 
the predicate upon which each corporation’s standing was based.131 
Personhood allows certain entities to shield their owners and management 
from personal liability.132 In contrast, sole proprietorships and partnerships 
                                                                                                             
 127. Id. at 2768 (“[I]t is important to keep in mind that the purpose of this 
fiction is to provide protection for human beings. A corporation is simply a form 
of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends. An established 
body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including 
shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in 
one way or another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended 
to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people.”). 
 128. Id. at 2797 (“The Court’s determination that RFRA extends to for-profit 
corporations is bound to have untoward effects. Although the Court attempts to 
cabin its language to closely held corporations, its logic extends to corporations 
of any size, public or private. Little doubt that RFRA claims will proliferate, for 
the Court’s expansive notion of corporate personhood—combined with its other 
errors in construing RFRA—invites for-profit entities to seek religion-based 
exemptions from regulations they deem offensive to their faith.”). 
 129. Id. at 2774 (“These cases, however, do not involve publicly traded 
corporations, and it seems unlikely that the sort of corporate giants to which HHS 
refers will often assert RFRA claims. . . . In any event, we have no occasion in 
these cases to consider RFRA’s applicability to such companies.”). 
 130. Id. at 2779 (“[T]he Hahns and Greens and their companies sincerely 
believe that providing the insurance coverage demanded by the HHS regulations 
lies on the forbidden side of the line, and it is not for us to say that their religious 
beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.”). 
 131. Id. at 2767–68. 
 132. N.L.R.B. v. Greater Kansas City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1052 (10th Cir. 
1993) (“The ‘separate corporate identity’ prong is meant to determine whether the 
stockholder and the corporation have maintained separate identities. There are 
strong public policy reasons for upholding the corporate fiction. Where 
stockholders follow the technical rules that govern the corporate structure, they 
are entitled to rely on the protections of limited liability that the corporation 
affords.”). 
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expose the individual owners to unlimited personal liability for the 
businesses debts and obligations.133 This “separateness” doctrine is also 
embodied in the federal tax code. Corporations generally pay entity-level 
income tax and shareholders are taxed on the ultimate distribution of that 
corporate income.134 This “double taxation” is a natural consequence of the 
corporation’s separateness. As Justice Ginsburg admonished, personhood 
should not be granted only when advantageous to the organization and its 
stakeholders.135  
B. Religion and the Soul 
The Hobby Lobby Court’s recognition of a business corporation’s 
religious rights necessitates the core consideration of what it means to have 
religious rights. Although the majority minimized distinctions between the 
exercise of religion by business entities and individuals or entities formed 
specifically for religious purposes, Justice Ginsburg recalled the policies 
underlying the stark historical distinction between the two types of 
entities.136 Likewise, individuals are acknowledged as having religious 
                                                                                                             
 133. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15, (UNIFORM LAW COMM’N 1997) (amended 
2013); REV’D UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 306(a) (UNIFORM LAW COMM’N 1997) 
(amended 2013). Under the Uniform Partnership Act (“UPA”), partners’ liability is 
joint and several for torts and joint but not several for contracts. Under the Revised 
Uniform Partnership Act (“RUPA”), partners are jointly and severally liable for all 
partnership obligations. 
 134. WILLIAM K. SJOSTROM, JR., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: A TRANSACTIONAL 
APPROACH 15 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 2013) (“A C-corporation is considered a 
separate taxpaying entity. Thus, it must file an annual income tax return (usually on 
Form 1120) reporting its income, deductions, and credits for the year and pay any 
resulting income tax at corporate income tax rates. If a C-corporation distributes 
money to its shareholders, the shareholders must include the distribution in their 
taxable incomes.” Variations on these entities have been developed to minimize the 
consequences of entity separateness while maintaining and maximizing the 
associated benefits. These variations include the development if the S-
Corporation, various forms of limited partnerships, limited liability companies.). 
 135. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (“By incorporating a business, 
however, an individual separates herself from the entity and escapes personal 
responsibility for the entity’s obligations. One might ask why the separation 
should hold only when it serves the interest of those who control the 
corporation.”). 
 136. Id. at 2794–95 (“The First Amendment’s free exercise protections, the 
Court has indeed recognized, shelter churches and other nonprofit religion-based 
organizations. . . . No such solicitude is traditional for commercial organizations. 
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rights historically denied to business corporations, with a seemingly 
consistent focus on the person seeking to exercise religion.137  
Neither the majority nor the dissent expressly defined the concept of 
religion; however, one need not look far for assistance in understanding 
its meaning. The very word “religion” is derived from the Latin word 
religionem, which translates to “respect for what is sacred, reverence for 
the gods.”138 There is a necessary connection between the concept of 
having a soul and having religious beliefs. The Christian Bible and the 
Hebrew Torah both contain numerous references to that connection, 
including a well-known and often referenced admonition that even in a 
place of suffering if “you seek the Lord your God, you will find him if you 
seek him with all you heart and with all your soul.”139 Similarly, the Quran 
references the soul in the context of divine providence, providing “[a] soul 
will not die but with the permission of Allah.”140 The soul is credited as 
the distinguishing feature between life and death.141  
C. The Soul and Criminal Culpability 
The term “soul” is synonymous with the ancient Greek term ethos, 
which refers to both morals and spirit that make a person unique and 
                                                                                                             
Indeed, until today, religious exemptions had never been extended to any entity 
operating in ‘the commercial, profit-making world.’”) (quoting Corp. of Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 
337 (1987)). 
 137. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 466 
(2010). 
 138. Douglas Harper, Religion, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=religion [https://perma.cc/3U32-
QXFS] (last visited Aug. 3, 2016).  
 139. Deuteronomy 4:29, (New International Version); see also Deuteronomy 
4:29 (Torah), translated in JEWISH PUBLICATION SOCIETY, TANAKH THE HOLY 
SCRIPTURES 281 (1988) (“But if you search there for the Lord your God, you will 
find Him, if only you seek Him with all your heart and soul . . . .”). 
 140. Quran 3:145, (M.H. Shakir trans.). 
 141. Soul, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/soul-reli 
gion-and-philosophy [https://perma.cc/479W-XR9N] (last visited Aug. 3, 2016) 
(“Many cultures have recognized some incorporeal principle of human life or 
existence corresponding to the soul, and many have attributed souls to all living 
things.”). 
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alive.142 Ethos can be traced back to the ancient Greek philosopher 
Aristotle as one of three modes of persuasion used by an effective speaker 
to communicate his or her message to the intended audience.143 This notion 
is important as it allowed the listener to evaluate the message, at least in 
part, based on the credibility and trustworthiness, or moral character, of 
the speaker.144 Contemporary references to ethos center on the 
characteristic spirit or prevalent tone of sentiment of a community, 
institution, or system.145 The ethos of modern organizations are often 
composed of intricate intra-organizational relationships that distinguish 
the collective personality of the entity from any of its individual 
stakeholders. The organization has the same evolutionary capacity 
commonly accepted as a part of the human experience.146 This phenomenon 
                                                                                                             
 142. Soul, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster 
.com/dictionary/soul [https://perma.cc/KPU8-NWV4] (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) 
(defining “soul” as “spiritual or moral force”). 
 143. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1122 (1991) (the other two modes 
involved the content of the speech and placing the audience in a mindset receptive 
to the communicated message).  
 144. Id. at 1122–23 (“This kind of eta theta omicron zeta is most important . . . to 
the success of the speech: for the opinion of any audience as to the credibility of the 
speaker depends mainly upon the view they take of his intentions and character 
intellectual and moral; his ability to form a judgment, his integrity and truthfulness 
and his disposition toward themselves, to one they will listen with attention, respect 
and favor; another if they look upon him as of the opposite character, they will regard 
with dislike and impatience and an inclination to disbelief and criticism.” (citing E. 
COPE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC 109–10 (1867)). 
 145. Modern Organizations, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
(3d ed. 1971). 
 146. Mark Lamport-Stokes, Augusta, Home of the Masters, Admits First Female 
Members, REUTERS, (Aug. 20, 2012, 6:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
golf-augusta-idUSBRE87J0IE20120820 [https://perma.cc/9D26-EL9S] (discussing 
Augusta’s changing position on its admission of women, though there undoubtedly 
are still individual longstanding male members who oppose the admission of female 
members to the association); Bruce Nolan, Bitter Mardi Gras Debate of Race, Class 
Evolves 20 Years Later into a Diverse Celebration, TIMES PICAYUNE (Feb. 12, 2012, 
7:00 AM), http://www.nola.com/mardigras/index.ssf/2012/02/mardi_gras_debate 
_of_race_clas.html [https://perma.cc/V9HL-2DCA] (discussing the removal of 
membership restrictions based on race by carnival organizations); Melanie Dostis, 
Hazing Embedded in College Culture?, USA TODAY (Nov. 21, 2013, 4:03 PM) 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/21/hazing-policy-changes/366 
5143/ [https://perma.cc/SV2Q-HWSR] (discussing the changing policies and 
positions of higher learning institutions and the fraternities and sororities on their 
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is apparent in everyday examples ranging from business corporations to 
educational institutions, fraternities, sororities, and other social benefit 
organizations.147  
The corporate ethos has also been examined and discussed as a primary 
motivator of criminal activity committed by corporate management and 
employees. Professor Pamela Bucy describes the ethos of an entity separate 
and apart from the business purpose for which it was formed.148 Her research 
revealed that the wrongdoing of corporate employees can be traced and 
attributed to an organizational culture that encourages and rewards wrongful 
behavior.149 Professor Bucy points to eight primary factors to consider in 
determining whether such an encouraging environment exists. The first factor 
asks whether corporate management is actively engaged in its operations or 
acts as a figurehead with plausible deniability for wrongdoing.150 The second 
asks whether corporate performance goals reward and encourage lawful 
behavior or whether the goals articulate unrealistic expectations that pressure 
employees to engage in illegal activities to meet organizational goals. The 
third places greater responsibility on corporations with employees who have 
more opportunities to engage in wrongful acts to educate employees regarding 
laws and regulations pertinent to the industry.151 The fourth points to 
                                                                                                             
campus regarding hazing); Micah Soloman, 9 Leadership Steps For Corporate 
Culture Change, FORBES (Sep. 27, 2014, 12:51 PM), http://www.forbes.com 
/sites/micahsolomon/2014/09/27/a-leadership-checklist-for-culture-change-and-custo 
mer-experience-excellence/#717af3083c47 [https://perma.cc/V7UU-ZZZU]. 
 147. See VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 1 (2d ed. 1886). 
 148. Bucy, supra note 143, at 1099–1100. 
 149. Id. at 1128. 
 150. Id. at 1129–30 (“The factfinder should focus its inquiries on whether 
management left unattended or inaccessible positions within the corporation 
where illegal behavior could have easily occurred. If positions were left 
unattended, the factfinder should scrutinize the reason for this: was there an honest 
and good faith oversight, or a callous recognition that if corporate employees 
commit illegal activity, it is best done outside the usual channels of supervision? 
Braithwaite’s study of the pharmaceutical industry provides a graphic example of 
the latter. He found that many companies have systemic policies to protect the 
chief executive from the taint of knowledge of illegalities. They do so by having 
‘vice presidents responsible for going to jail.’ The corporate directors tell the vice 
presidents: ‘I don’t want to know how you do it . . . just get the job done.’” 
(quoting JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY, 308, 322, 355–58, 365, 370 (1984))). 
 151. Id. at 1134–35 (“The following types of inquiries are relevant in assessing 
this factor: Are the appropriate employees informed of regulatory changes that 
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compliance programs as important in preventing a culture that encourages 
employee wrongdoing.152 The fifth factor looks at whether an individual 
employee acted alone in committing wrongdoing or whether other agents 
participated in, aided, or “recklessly tolerated” the illegal activity.153 The 
culpability of upper level management would usually be considered more 
important than the culpability of lower level employees in determining 
whether the wrongful activity was driven by the organizational ethos. The 
sixth factor involves past violations and whether the responsible parties 
suffered consequences for their actions or enjoyed rewards for their 
conduct.154 Attempts by the corporation to conceal the wrongdoing and 
failures to remedy past wrongdoing can also be indicia of a culpable corporate 
environment.155 The seventh factor accounts for compensation and bonus 
structures that, like unrealistic corporate goals, provide perverse incentives 
for employee wrongdoing.156 The final factor is complex and 
controversial, involving indemnification and insurance policies that the 
vast majority of—if not all—corporations have in place for the benefit of 
officers and directors.157 Professor Bucy acknowledges that using director 
and officer liability policies as indicia of a criminal ethos would make 
virtually every corporation in America indictable.158 Accordingly, this 
factor requires a delicately deliberate application to ensure that valid 
mechanisms for defending agents and corporate interests are not subverted 
in the name of measuring ethos. 
                                                                                                             
affect their duties? Are the new regulations explained in a comprehensible 
manner? Do middle management executives hold regular meetings to discuss 
problems of compliance? Is the corporate legal staff available for discussions on 
compliance? Does middle management have specific training programs in the 
areas of ethics and government regulation?”). 
 152. Id. at 1136. These programs would include internal audits, open door 
policies that welcome employee communication with management, requirements 
that employees sign written acknowledgements of relevant laws and the risk of 
termination for illegal activity, and the establishment of an ombudsman to field 
compliance questions and concerns. 
 153. Id. at 1138 (comparing the doctrine of respondeat superior and the MPC 
standard with the corporate ethos standard). 
 154. Id. at 1138–39. 
 155. See id. 
 156. Id. at 1139. 
 157. See Bucy, supra note 143, at 1134–35, 1140. This factor explores whether 
corporate indemnification or reimbursement of the culpable employee for 
associated criminal or civil exposure conceivably rewarded and incentivized the 
culpable behavior. Id. at 1140. 
 158. See id. at 1145. 
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An organizational personhood concept closely related to the corporate 
ethos doctrine is the corporate decision-making model referred to as the 
Corporate Internal Decision (“CID”) Structure.159 CID explains how an 
organization processes information and decides on a course of action 
based on goals and objectives it finds in its best interest.160 As is the case 
with measuring the ethos of an organization, the decisions made by an 
organization usually extend beyond the preferences of an individual 
stakeholder and result from group collaboration.161 The CID model 
contains two components most relevant to this analysis.162 The first 
involves an organizational structure providing the divisions of authority 
and responsibility within the organization.163 The second component 
describes the processes for making decisions, usually termed “policies and 
procedures.”164 This model has a number of demonstrated benefits in the 
traditional business context that can also be extended to measuring 
criminal culpability.165 Thoughts and intentions are virtually impossible to 
measure without manifestations by which to measure them.166 This fact is 
true of organizations and individuals.167 The CID model allows for measuring 
organizational decisions upon which corporate agents base their actions, as 
well as the deliberations that produced those decisions.168 Accordingly, 
models measuring organizational ethos and decision-making can help 
determine whether the mens rea element of corporate criminal liability has 
been satisfied, removing the need to rely on respondeat superior and other 
doctrines crafted to address the inability to satisfy the mens rea requirement 
generally embedded in criminal law.169 
                                                                                                             
 159. Robert E. Wagner, Criminal Corporate Character, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1293, 
1309–10 (2013).  
 160. Id. 
 161. See Ripken, supra note 91, at 127. 
 162. See Wagner, supra note 159.  
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See Bucy, supra note 143, at 1161. 
 166. See id. at 1161–63.  
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. (discussing various means of evaluating mens rea through measurable 
actions). The CID structure aids in determining whether those in authority made 
decisions to engage in, encouraged, rewarded, or created an environment that 
facilitated criminal conduct conduct. Id. 
 169. See generally id. 
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IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST GREATER ALIGNMENT OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL SENTENCING 
Critics of closer alignment between organizational and individual 
sentencing guidelines might offer several arguments for maintaining the status 
quo. First, critics might argue that alignment is pointless because corporations 
cannot be jailed, seemingly the primary purpose of aligning penalties for 
organizations with those imposed on individuals.170 Furthermore, critics 
might argue that further punishment of the corporation is unnecessary because 
the entity-level liability shield does not protect the wrongdoer from civil or 
criminal liability for his actions.171 Critics might also argue that punishing the 
corporation unfairly penalizes innocent parties who may not have engaged in 
or have direct knowledge of the culpable behavior; some might argue that the 
existing organizational guidelines are an unjustifiable overreach.172 Still 
others might argue that any needed reforms can be addressed in the deferred 
prosecution and non-prosecution agreement processes.173 
A. Sentencing Alignment is Unrealistic Because Organizations Cannot be 
Jailed 
Some critics argue that equating the prosecution and sentencing of an 
organization to that of an individual is pointless because jail, among the most 
severe penalties that can be imposed on a convicted person, is not a realistic 
option for juridical entities.174 This argument is based on the proposition that 
the juridical entity has “no body to be kicked.”175 A surface comparison of 
corporate personhood with the concept of jail might make the conclusion 
seem justified. The Reform Act provides for imprisonment of individuals 
but is silent with respect to organizations.176 Imprisonment is not defined 
in that chapter, but § 3621 incorporates by reference the prison sentences 
permitted in § 3551 and grants the U.S. Department of Corrections the 
                                                                                                             
 170. See id. at 1178. 
 171. See Bucy, supra note 143, at 1180. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. at 1179–80. 
 174. See Wagner, supra note 159; see also Brandon L. Garrett, The 
Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 135 (2014). 
 175. See Coffee, supra note 5. 
 176. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2012). 
2016] INCOMPLETE SENTENCES 105 
 
 
 
power to designate the geographic location of confinement, typically a 
government correctional facility.177  
However, a deeper look reveals analogous mechanisms that might be 
employed to achieve the desired objectives for which imprisonment is 
designed.178 First, it should be noted that jurisprudence and scholarship are 
generally devoid of a policy rationale disqualifying incarceration as a 
criminal sentencing option for organizations.179 The finding that jailing an 
organization is not a viable option seems to rest on practical grounds. 
Critics might argue that placing the computers and furniture owned by a 
corporation in a designated place under lock and key for a proscribed 
period of time makes little sense.180 One could also imagine a host of 
constitutional issues associated with attempting to place otherwise 
innocent members of the organization behind bars. However, existing 
bankruptcy law, and its reasons for why incarceration was established, 
provides translatable concepts that could be applied in the organizational 
                                                                                                             
 177. 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (2012). Interestingly, this section refers to the imprisonment 
of a convicted “person,” not individual which would better correlate with the 
distinctions made between organizations as persons and individuals as persons. Id. 
 178. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012) (providing the factors to be considered in 
sentencing, but not distinguishing between individuals and organizations). 
 179. See generally Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271 
(1959). 
 180. See Henning, supra note 39, at 1424–25 n.32 (citing United States v. 
Allegheny Bottling Co., 695 F.Supp. 856, 858-59 (E.D. Va. 1988), reversed in 
part by U.S. v. Allegheny Bottling Co., 870 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1989)).  
The district judge explained his analysis of a potential corporate 
imprisonment: “Corporate imprisonment requires only that the Court 
restrain or immobilize the corporation. Such restraint of individuals is 
accomplished by, for example, placing them in the custody of the United 
States Marshal. Likewise, corporate imprisonment can be accomplished 
by simply placing the corporation in the custody of the United States 
Marshal. The United States Marshal would restrain the corporation by 
seizing the corporation’s physical assets or part of the assets or restricting 
its actions or liberty in a particular manner. When this sentence was 
contemplated, the United States Marshal for the Eastern District of 
Virginia, Roger Ray, was contacted. When asked if he could imprison 
Allegheny Pepsi, he stated that he could. He stated that he restrained 
corporations regularly for bankruptcy court. He stated that he could close 
the physical plant itself and guard it. He further stated that he could allow 
employees to come and go and limit certain actions or sales if that is what 
the Court imposes.” 
Id. 
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context.181 In the bankruptcy context, a trustee is appointed to manage the 
affairs of a debtor for the benefit of creditors and other interested parties.182 
Under the supervision of the court, the trustee has complete control over the 
accumulation and disposition of assets and personnel decisions and otherwise 
conducts the entity’s business affairs.183 Because the corporation has no 
tangible body besides its accounts, assets, and relationships with natural 
persons, the bankruptcy trustee is charged with caring for and possessing the 
body of the corporation. Similarly, a prison warden is charged with the care 
and custody of inmates while having control of their physical persons.184 Like 
trustees, wardens serve in primarily administrative capacities, managing the 
finances, personnel, and inmate population while maintaining a safe and 
secure facility for the protection of external and internal constituencies.185 A 
fiduciary, similar to a bankruptcy trustee, who is responsible for the sentenced 
organization during the time served, could aid in the jailing of business 
entities.  
B. Sentencing Alignment is Unnecessary Because Culpable Agents, 
Through Whom Organizations Act, Can be Held Criminally Responsible 
Critics also argue that aligning organizational sentencing with 
individual sentencing is unnecessary because both are designed to address 
culpable behavior that can only be carried out by natural persons.186 It is 
true that “[c]orporations, ‘separate and apart from’ the human beings who 
own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all.”187 
However, current sentencing policy already accepts the concept of entity-
level liability.188 Furthermore, reserving certain types of sentences for 
culpable individuals will only incentivize scapegoating and other 
                                                                                                             
 181. See Saladrigas, supra note 69 (containing a detailed discussion of the 
complications in coordinating simultaneous prosecutions and bankruptcy 
proceedings involving the same corporate and individual wrongdoers).  
 182. See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).   
 183. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012). 
 184. Casey Kennedy, Roles of a Warden, HOUSTON CHRON., http://work.chron 
.com/roles-warden-19102.html [https://perma.cc/6Q73-FMLH] (last visited Mar. 27, 
2016). 
 185. See id. 
 186. Alschuler, supra note 77, at 1391–92. 
 187. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
 188. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553. 
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gamesmanship within the organization.189 It also fails to address situations 
in which identifying a single or group of culpable actors is difficult, but 
the wrongdoing and associate harm is evident.190 Greater organizational 
sentencing exposure increases the likelihood that the wrongdoer will be 
brought to justice while providing a disincentive for the organization to 
tolerate or encourage such behavior.  
C. Organizational Sentencing Already Punishes Innocent Parties and 
Enhanced Organizational Penalties Only Exacerbate the Problem 
Critics further argue that organizational sentencing already harms 
innocent parties and any potential increase in organizational sentences 
only exacerbates the problem.191 However, even the critics acknowledge 
that part of the fight is already lost because fines imposed on convicted 
corporations can have collateral effects on innocent parties in ways similar 
to incarceration.192 These critics vigorously dispute the integrity of 
comparisons between the ancillary suffering endured by the beneficiaries 
of an organizational defendant and that of the families, employees, and 
other associates of a convicted and sentenced individual.193 However, 
there is no noteworthy reason to offer more sympathy to those collaterally 
affected by organizational wrongdoing than those families, businesses, 
                                                                                                             
 189. See Bucy, supra note 143, at 1129 (citing J. BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE 
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and communities the criminal justice system has left behind.194 The 
question remains whether the shareholders and employees truly suffer any 
less when a talented but corrupt CEO is removed from the company after 
his crimes drove positive company valuation. Is that really worse than 
placing an administrator in charge of the company to ensure that past 
wrongs are remedied? These stakeholders are not helpless corporate 
dependents. The Citizens United majority referred to “the procedures of 
corporate democracy” as a means by which these persons can protect their 
interests.195 
CONCLUSION 
Organizational personhood has evolved to a point in modern American 
law where these persons are recognized as having characteristics quite similar 
to those historically reserved for individuals. However, the Reform Act and 
attendant guidelines maintain distinct approaches to sentencing individuals 
and organizations largely based on historical personhood differences. The 
Hobby Lobby Court’s recognition of a business corporation’s religious rights 
implicates a corporate soul and a corresponding increase in corporate criminal 
culpability. Accordingly, the Reform Act and attendant sentencing guidelines 
should be amended to better address the organizational soul and 
corresponding criminal culpability implicated by the Hobby Lobby Court’s 
recognition of business corporations’ religious rights. 
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